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ought to be chosen in partisan elections (as they are in North Caro-
lina), nor is it to say that individual rights should be at the mercy of 
plebiscites. It is simply to observe that even Federalists like Alexan-
der Hamilton, smarter and much more elite than anybody else, real-
ized that they had somehow to square liberty with popular rule: 
they appealed from the people angry to the people calm. Constitu-
tions are the higher law precisely because they are the majority's 
considered opinion. 
REFLECI'IONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACI'ION BABY. 
By Stephen L. Carter.1 New York: Basic Books. 1991. Pp. 
xiii, 286. Cloth, $23.00. 
Daniel R. Ortiz 2 
Despite its press, this is not really a book about affirmative ac-
tion. To be sure, it swipes at the various arguments used to justify 
affirmative action programs, challenges many orthodoxies and ar-
gues for a major overhauling of racial preferences, but its real con-
cern lies elsewhere-in the contemporary politics of African-
American identity. Racial preferences may have sparked these re-
flections, but racial identity remains the focus of their true concern. 
To understand this, however, discussion must begin with Carter's 
ostensible subject: affirmative action. 
Carter takes on both the "traditional" and "modern" ap-
proaches to racial preferences, by which he means the remedial and 
diversity justifications, respectively. Although both approaches ac-
tually have a long history in the debate and can, for example, be 
found in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,3 it is true 
that the diversity rationale, the "modern" approach, has enjoyed 
increasing prominence with the advent of critical race studies.4 The 
more "traditional" approach captures little of Carter's interest and 
he dispatches it quickly. 
Against those who believe that racial preferences are permissi-
ble and sometimes even necessary to remedy racial oppression, 
Carter makes three primary arguments. First, he notes that racial 
oppression has not harmed all African-Americans the same way. 
I. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Professor of Law and Harrison Foundation Research Professor, University of 
Virginia. 
3. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
4. See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705. 
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Some, including himself, have suffered from it but arrived with 
nearly all their opportunities intact. Others, he admits, have not. 
But for him the point remains that oppression has not injured every 
African-American in equally serious ways and that different forms 
of oppression have injured members of other classes. Thus, simple 
racial preferences seem a very rough remedy. 
Second, Carter argues that racial preferences cannot effectively 
compensate for any past disadvantage. The belief that they can is 
simply a "pretense" we should "abandon." This is true, he argues, 
because racial preferences help those African-Americans who need 
help least or, put differently, those who most need compensation are 
least able to take advantage of the benefits affirmative action pro-
grams can bring. In education and the professions, for example, 
affirmative action is just a form of "racial justice on the cheap" that 
eases white guilt and benefits middle-class African-Americans while 
ignoring the misery of the larger number of blacks in the lower 
class. 
In fact, to the extent people believe preferences help remedy 
inequality they may actually deepen it instead. The more we are 
lulled into complacency with cheap, cosmetic fixes, the less likely 
we are to tackle the primary and more intractable obstacles to black 
advancement, like the "social infrastructure of inner-city communi-
ties." Unlike affirmative action, programs that address these real 
problems do not come cheaply. 
Third, Carter argues that the costs of affirmative action to the 
black community itself clearly outweigh any benefits such programs 
might bring. Racial preferences, in his view, inevitably marginalize 
those they aim to help. They limit the range of African-American 
ambition and success to that of being not the best, but only the 
"best black." Like any double standard, those implied in racial 
preferences stigmatize the success of those they help. Under the 
guise of redressing injury, they reintrench the stereotype of black 
inferiority more deeply-in the eyes of both whites and people of 
color. 
None of these arguments is new. They represent the standard 
objections to remedial justifications for affirmative action. The only 
innovation is that Carter, a self-admitted beneficiary of such pro-
grams and leading African-American scholar, is now leading the 
charge. The importance of this part of the book, in other words, 
lies not in what is said, but in who says it. This is true in two 
senses. First, Carter's identity as a beneficiary and a scholar of 
color may lead people inside and outside the African-American 
community to take the arguments against such programs more seri-
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ously. If people within the community itself speak against prefer-
ences, we cannot dismiss the arguments as easily as we might have 
before. Second, and more important, the hostile reception of 
Carter's views within the Mrican-American community leads him 
to explore his place in that community and the notion of racial iden-
tity itself. This part of the book more seriously engages him and 
holds much more interest for the reader. 
Racial identity implicates what Carter calls the modern or di-
versity rationale for affirmative action, which he unequivocally re-
jects. Unlike the earlier approach, this view makes difference, not 
injury, central. It holds that African-Americans, regardless of any 
injury they have suffered, should be represented in many arenas be-
cause of their distinctive cultural perspective. Although Carter ad-
mits that "history does make black people different from white 
people" he argues both that this history does not make blacks differ-
ent in "some predictable ... way" and that blacks' difference should 
not be valued any more than anyone else's. Holding all three of 
these beliefs together, however, proves difficult. 
Carter's rejection of the diversity rationale represents an ob-
lique attack on critical race theory. Unfortunately, he somewhat 
misrepresents it. To him, critical race theorists value black differ-
ence almost solely because of historical oppression. Only the suffer-
ing of African-Americans, he believes, could warrant the privilege 
diversity theorists would grant the black perspective. This view dis-
comforts him because it creates a "hierarchy of suffering" that "re-
ject[s] ... the idea that recognizing difference can be a binding 
force, a form of love." "[M]ak[ing] the fact of suffering the badge of 
authority defeats the purpose of valuing diversity," for it "make[s] a 
potentially bitter contest of what ought to be a solemn and shared 
understanding." The problem with critical race theorists, in other 
words, is that they divide those who have suffered from each other 
rather than bringing them together. To avoid this danger, Carter 
would enforce a parity among marginalized voices, even if the effect 
is to subordinate them all to majoritarian perspectives. 
Critical race theory, however, does not value diversity just be-
cause of the suffering that may have defined it. We can privilege a 
black perspective, if we agree with Carter that one exists, without 
creating a divisive hierarchy of suffering. In this view, we should 
recognize difference not because of suffering, though that might 
make such recognition even more important, but rather because 
"love," to use Carter's term, requires us to recognize what is cen-
trally important to others we respect. We should value African-
Americans' viewpoints and seek to include them in many of the 
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arenas of culture, in other words, because such perspectives distinc-
tively and centrally characterize a community of importance to us. 
How can we "love" without granting such respect? 
Relational feminism, another diversity perspective Carter dis-
cusses, makes this point clear. Unlike Carter's version of critical 
race theory, relational feminism does not rest its argument for valu-
ing women's "different voice" on women's oppression. Relational 
feminists argue instead that we should represent this different view-
point in culture simply because it is different and characterizes 
many people.s The relationship between representation and oppres-
sion is, in fact, just the opposite of what Carter portrays with re-
spect to race. To relational feminists, suffering results from failing 
to acknowledge difference. It is not the case that difference neces-
sarily stems from suffering.6 
At bottom, then, Carter fails to engage critical race theory's 
concept of identity. Recognizing diversity does not have to create 
contests of suffering that divide oppressed peoples from each other 
but can instead represent "a form of love." Valuing central differ-
ences can be the highest form of respect one community can pay 
another. This does not, of course, solve all the difficulties. We must 
still determine when a community has a different perspective, how 
central that perspective is to its identity and whether the commu-
nity deserves respect. To be sure, these are hard questions. But we 
cannot ignore them simply them because they are hard. Otherwise 
we put ourselves in the position of having to say that since the 
Jaycees and African-Americans both have viewpoints over some 
questions that differ from the rest of society's we have to respect 
both their perspectives equally-which, in Carter's terms, means 
not at all. 
Carter's ultimate conclusions suggest that he himself distrusts 
some of his arguments. As he admits, "[g]iven the logic of all that I 
have said [against affirmative action], I often feel that I should op-
pose all racial preferences in admission to college and professional 
school. But I don't." Instead, he advocates a return to affirmative 
action's "roots." To him, "the proper goal of all racial preferences 
is opportunity-the chance at advanced training for highly moti-
5. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Devel-
opment 105, 173-74 (Harv. U. Press, 1982). 
6. In fact, the view that women's different voice reflects oppression represents the most 
powerful radical feminist critique of relational feminism. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Dif-
ference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life 
and Law 32, 39 (Harv. U. Press, 1987) ("Women value care because men have valued us 
according to the care we give them, and we could probably use some. Women think in 
relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to men."). 
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vated people of color who, for whatever complex set of reasons, 
might not otherwise have it." This sounds innocuous enough, but 
how can he defend it? 
Enhancing opportunity for one group diminishes opportunity 
for others. Giving opportunity to those who "might not otherwise 
have it" also presupposes the use of a separate standard for people 
of color. But, according to Carter's own reasoning, such double 
standards lead to invidious racial stereotyping and the "best black" 
syndrome. How can we justify either breaching meritocratic stan-
dards or placing these kinds of costs on people of color? Carter 
never answers and for good reason. On some level he would have to 
resort to exactly the types of justifications he has rejected. Carter's 
position thus contains a highly charged ambivalence which threat-
ens to undermine his claims. 
The root of his ambivalence lies in his notion of black distinc-
tiveness. Although he admits that blacks are different from whites, 
he argues against any definite sense of difference. Like much bad 
deconstructive theory, blacks seem to be characterized not so much 
by particular differences, but by difference itself. Thus, "[racial 
s]olidarity ... means not, as the diversity movement would have it, 
embracing some special perspective gained from our history of op-
pression; ... it means rather, embracing our people themselves, in 
all their wild and frustrating variety." 
But can one ground a group identity largely in group members' 
differences from one another? I think not. First, it would be impos-
sible to define the group's outer boundaries. Are other groups, par-
ticularly whites, less internally diverse? Second, internal diversity is 
at bottom inimical to the very concept of a group identity. The 
more different people within a group are from one another and the 
more important those differences are to them, the less likely they 
are to view themselves as a meaningful group. The more numerous 
and important the differences, in other words, the thinner the 
shared identity. 
Carter wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, he insists 
that black group identity is thick enough to be constitutive of his 
and other blacks' individual identity. Race, he says at one point, 
defines "all that we are." On the other hand, however, he insists 
that there can be no "shibboleths" that define one as a black. His 
call for "[black] unity, not in the sense of groupthink but in the 
sense of group love," suggests that racial solidarity lies primarily in 
toleration of difference. African-Americans, in this view, are a peo-
ple with a shared history but no real shared values. They seem 
more a bunch of classical liberals who happen to be black-just an-
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other caucus in the liberal community-than a people with a special 
culture. 
So deep does Carter's belief in liberalism run, moreover, that 
he thinks "identification with an ethnic group" should be "a con-
scious decision." Even community affiliation should reflect autono-
mous choice. Thus, in his fantasies, he muses over the possibility of 
purely voluntaristic communities: "What I envision is the possibil-
ity that each of us might make a choice about which racial group we 
prefer to join." He recognizes, of course, that race is not now a 
choice, but it "should ideally be [one], a decision one makes to 
claim a people, a culture, a history, as one's own." 
I must admit that, as a cranky liberal myself, I have some sym-
pathy for this unrealistic position. But I do not think you can have 
it both ways. Either the community is special, rich, and constitutive 
of individual identity or it is not. The problem may be that Carter 
finds himself trying to straddle a divide within the African-Ameri-
can community itself. Carter quite honestly describes himself as 
different in many respects from most African-Americans. He is "a 
middle-class professional living in the suburbs," one of affirmative 
action's success stories. His success, however, places him across a 
class divide from most of the people he shares a history with, a 
divide which, he believes, now more than race determines the life 
opportunities of people of color. 
At times Carter acknowledges these limits to his experience 
and carefully narrows his arguments to the black middle and pro-
fessional classes. Thus, in a footnote, for example, he states that 
many of his arguments against affirmative action do not extend to 
nonprofessionals. At other times, however, Carter speaks as an "in-
tellectual" whose black experience qualifies him to speak to all parts 
of the African-American community. He realizes his own differ-
ence from most of the people he speaks to but still finds it necessary 
to be considered part of the group. This causes him to stretch 
group identity very thin, thin enough to cover both the middle and 
poorer classes. 
His own belief that class, more than race, now defines people's 
opportunities should lead him to question this strategy. If he is 
right, there are several black communities, not just one, and on 
some particular issues some of them may identify more with mem-
bers of other groups, including some whites, than with other black 
communities. Carter suggests, moreover, that the success of affirm-
ative action may itself be partly responsible for this community divi-
sion. Insofar as his own views of preferences represent a classically 
liberal, middle-class outlook, they reflect the success of those civil 
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rights programs, including preferences, that enabled him to reach or 
stay in the middle-class. Thus, affirmative action may in one sense 
be self-limiting. Its very success may be partially responsible for 
calls from within some quarters of the black community to limit it. 
This is not, however, a simple case either of majoritarian coop-
tion or of some victims pulling up the ladder before others have a 
chance to escape. It instead reflects the importance of economic 
status to self-definition in our culture. As Carter says: "The day is 
gone when large numbers of black students see themselves as the 
vanguard of a revolution; what students want now, and with reason, 
is a piece of the action. So do 1." Perhaps one effect of the civil 
rights movement's success is the development of such class fissures 
within the African-American community. Carter's reflections, 
then, are ultimately not about affirmative action, but about what it 
means to be both black and traditionally successful in a world that 
still limits many blacks' chances of success. The book's importance, 
in other words, lies not in its arguments, but in its ambivalences. 
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF 
THE WARREN COURT. By Tinsley E. Yarbrough.t New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 395. Cloth, 
$29.95. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
As Earl Warren and his Court moved aggressively in the late 
1950s and early 1960s to eradicate racial segregation and to extend 
the Bill of Rights to the states, the first Justice John Marshall 
Harlan became a patron saint to Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas 
and other of its more liberal, activist members. The former slave 
owner from Kentucky, mocked by Justice Holmes as "my lion-
hearted friend," had dissented in The Civil Rights Cases,3 P/essy v. 
Ferguson,4 Hurtado v. Ca/ifornia,s and Twining v. New Jersey,6 all of 
which established his claim to being the jurisprudential progenitor 
of those who battled to expunge racism from the Constitution and 
to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
I. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
4. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
5. Ito u.s. 516 (1884). 
6. 211 u.s. 78 (1908). 
